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PATENT LICENSING BY MEANS OF AN AUCTION: 
INTERNAL VS. EXTERNAL PATENTEE 
 






An independent research laboratory owns a patented process innovation that can 
be licensed by means of an auction to two Cournot duopolists producing differentiated 
goods. For large innovations and close enough substitute goods the patentee auctions o¤ 
only one license, preventing the full diffusion of the innovation. For this range of 
parameters, however, if the laboratory merged with one of the firms in the industry, full 
technology diffusion would be implemented as the merged entity would always license 
the innovation to the rival firm. This explains that, in this context, a vertical merger is 
both profitable and welfare improving. 
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 1 Introduction
The patent licensing literature has focused on the analysis of optimal
licensing contracts with the laboratory being either an external or an
internal patentee.1 However, it seems interesting to endogenize market
structure by analyzing whether the laboratory prefers to license the in-
novation as an external patentee or to merge with one of the ￿rms in
the industry, licensing the innovation as an internal patentee. Sandon￿s
and Faul￿-Oller (2006) deals with this issue in a setting with di⁄erenti-
ated goods and two Cournot duopolists. They consider two-part tari⁄
licensing contracts (a ￿ at upfront fee plus a linear royalty) and get the
strong result that all pro￿table vertical mergers reduce welfare. Thus,
in that context, no vertical merger will occur in equilibrium if it has to
be approved by a welfare maximizing antitrust authority.
It is well-known in the literature, however, that the patentee can
extract more surplus when the upfront fee is not directly chosen by the
patentee itself but it is determined through an auction (see Katz and
Shapiro, 1985 and Sen and Tauman, 2006). An auction generates more
competition for the license, increasing the ￿rms￿willingness to pay for it.
Then, if an auction is feasible, the patentee would rather use an auction
(plus royalty) policy instead of a two-part tari⁄ contract.
Patent auctions are not only of academic interest. We have recently
observed that they are used in practice by ￿rms as a way to market and
derive revenues from their patent portfolios. For example, on April 6,
2006 the ￿rst-of-its kind live patent auction was held in San Francisco
(Tyde and Bates, 2006). The auction was hosted by Ocean Tomo, an
Intellectual Property (IP) consulting ￿rm based in Chicago. The sellers
included companies such as BellSouth, Motorolla, Ford Motor as well
as independent inventors as Andrea Rose and Douglas J. Ballantyne.
1See Kamien and Tauman (1984, 1986, 2002), Katz and Shapiro (1986), Kamien
et al. (1992), Kamien (1992), Erutku and Richelle (2000), Saracho (2002), Wang
(1998), Wang and Yang (1999).Among the buyers, GE, Du Pont, Microsoft, Nokia, Kodak, IBM and
ATT. Given the success of this auction, Ocean Tomo has already sched-
uled another auction for October 25, 2006 in New York City.
The main purpose of this paper is to check the robustness of the re-
sults in Sandon￿s and Faul￿-Oller (2006) when we allow for the possibility
of licensing by means of an auction. Interestingly, things do change in a
non-trivial way. We know that under a vertical merger the technology is
always transferred to the rival ￿rm. On the contrary, we show that for
large innovations and close enough substitute goods an external patentee
prefers to auction o⁄only one license, precluding the full di⁄usion of the
innovation. As a result, in this case, a merger becomes pro￿table and
increases welfare. In other words, in that case, we prescribe a lenient
merger policy in order to promote technology di⁄usion.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we describe
the model and obtain the results. We conclude in Section 3.
2 Model
We consider two ￿rms, 1 and 2, each producing a di⁄erentiated good
(goods 1 and 2 respectively). They face inverse demand functions given
by:
pi = 1 ￿ xi ￿ ￿xj;i;j = 1;2; i 6= j (1)
where ￿ 2 [0;1] represents the degree of product di⁄erentiation. These
demands are derived from the maximization problem of a representative
consumer (see Singh and Vives (1984)), endowed with a utility function
separable in money (denoted by m) given by:








￿ ￿x1x2 + m (2)
The two ￿rms have constant unit production costs of c. There exists
an independent laboratory that have a patented process innovation that
3allows the production of the two goods at a lower marginal cost, that
we assume, for simplicity, to be zero. Thus, c can also be interpreted as
the size of the innovation.
Let us de￿ne the social welfare function as:
W(x1;x2) = u(x1;x2) ￿ c1x1 ￿ c2x2; (3)
where ci = 0; i = 1;2; if the technology is licensed to ￿rm i and ci = c
otherwise.
We distinguish the case where the laboratory is an external patentee
and where it merges with one of the ￿rms in the industry, becoming
an internal patentee. In the case of an external patentee the timing of
the game is as follows. In the ￿rst stage, the laboratory announces its
licensing policy. In the second stage, ￿rms simultaneously set their bids.
Finally, both ￿rms compete in quantities.
When the laboratory auctions o⁄ one license, the patentee ￿rst an-
nounces non-negative royalties ri, i = 1;2, that will be paid by the
winner of the auction, namely, the ￿rm with the highest bid2. When the
patentee auctions o⁄ two licenses, the patentee ￿rst announces royalties
ri, i = 1;2 and minimum bids bi, i = 1;2. The auction has to include
minimum bids as, otherwise, ￿rms would get the technology for free.
The technology is awarded to ￿rm i whenever its bid is not lower than
bi.
In the case of an internal patentee, things are much simpler, because
its only choice is whether or not to license the innovation to the rival ￿rm.
Observe that, in this case, the auction must again include a minimum
bid.
In Sandon￿s and Faul￿-Oller (2006), the same game is analyzed for the
2We assume that, in case of equal bids, the technology is awarded to the ￿rm with
the lowest royalty. If both ￿rms have the same royalty the technology is awarded
randomly.
4case of two-part tari⁄contracts (a ￿ at fee plus a linear royalty contract).
It is intuitive that, whenever there is competition for the license, an
auction plus royalty policy is superior for the patentee to a two part
tari⁄ contract: an auction generates more competition that increases
￿rms￿willingness to pay for the license. When the patentee auctions
o⁄ licenses to all ￿rms, however, there is no competition for the license
and the choice of minimum bids and royalties in the auction policy is
equivalent to the choice of ￿ at-fees and royalties in the two-part tari⁄
policy. Therefore, the optimal auction plus royalty policy for the case of
an internal patentee and for the case of an external patentee licensing to
all ￿rms is already analyzed in Sandon￿s and Faul￿-Oller (2006). Thus, we
have to formally analyze only the case of an external patentee auctioning
o⁄ one license.
First of all, let us specify the third stage equilibrium outputs and





(2 ￿ ￿) ￿ 2ri + ￿rj
4 ￿ ￿2 g;0g;
￿i(ri;rj) = X2
i ;i;j = 1;2;i 6= j;
(4)
where ri and rj are the royalties imposed by the licensing contract to
￿rm i and j and where
1 ￿ ri
2
represents the monopoly output of ￿rm
i and the second term represents the duopoly output. When any ￿rm i
has no license, we have to replace ri by c in the above expression.
The willingness to pay for the patent by a ￿rm is the di⁄erence
between its pro￿ts when it gets the technology and its pro￿ts when
the rival gets the technology. Assume that ri ￿ rj. In this case, the
willingness to pay is higher for ￿rm j, because ￿j(rj;c) ￿ ￿j(c;ri) ￿
￿i(ri;c) ￿ ￿i(c;rj).3 Then, the equilibrium bids are equal to ￿rm i￿ s
willingness to pay ￿i(ri;c) ￿ ￿i(c;rj). Given the tie-breaking rule, the
3Observe that this can be written as: ￿i(c;rj) + ￿j(rj;c) ￿ ￿i(ri;c) + ￿j(c;ri).
This inequality holds, because
@(￿i(c;r) + ￿j(r;c))
@r
< 0 for r ￿ c.
5patent is awarded to ￿rm j. Thus, the problem for the patentee is given
by:
Max
ri;rj ￿i(ri;c) ￿ ￿i(c;rj) + rjXj(rj;c)
s:t c￿ri ￿ rj ￿ 0
Observe that the objective function is decreasing in ri. Therefore,
the patentee will set ri = rj = r. Then, the problem can be rewritten
as a function of r and it is direct to see that its optimal value is r￿ = 0.
In order to choose the optimal auction plus royalty policy, the exter-
nal patentee has to compare the pro￿ts of licensing to one or two ￿rms.
This comparison leads to the following result, which is proved in the
Appendix.
Proposition 1 Whenever ￿ > 0:94 and c 2 (c;c) the patentee optimally
auctions o⁄ one license.
The intuition behind the result is as follows: on the one hand, auc-
tioning o⁄ only one license has the advantage of generating competition
for the patent, increasing the willingness to pay for it. On the other
hand, the patentee loses the potential revenues from selling one addi-
tional license. However, for large innovations and close substitute goods,
the output of the non-licensee is small and, therefore, the lost revenues
from not licensing are also small. In this case, the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates,
which explains the result. Observe that this dominance is very clear
precisely in the case where the non-licensee does not produce. Consider
the extreme case of homogeneous goods and a drastic innovation (￿ = 1;
c =
2￿￿
2 ). In this case, the most any ￿rm is willing to bid in the auction
of one license is the monopoly pro￿ts, given that the loser ￿rm will be
driven out of the market. Thus, an auction of one license allows the
patentee to get the whole monopoly pro￿ts, whereas auctioning o⁄ two
licenses the external patentee is not able to monopolize the market (it







2 ). As a result, an auction must be superior. The
result also holds for values of ￿ slightly below 1 and for values of c
around
2￿￿
2 . Observe that c <
2￿￿
2 < c. For c > c, the external patentee
would prefer to license to both ￿rms. The intuition is clear for values of
c ￿
4+2￿￿￿2
4(1+￿) ￿ c. In this case, the external patentee would get the full
monopoly pro￿ts when licensing to both ￿rms and the monopoly pro￿ts
in one market when auctioning o⁄only one license. The result also holds
for values of c in the interval (c;
4+2￿￿￿2
4(1+￿) ).
Recall that the case where licensing to both ￿rms is optimal is already
analyzed in Sandon￿s and Faul￿-Oller (2006), because auctioning o⁄two
licenses is equivalent to a two-part tari⁄ licensing policy. In this case,
we know that all pro￿table vertical mergers are welfare-reducing. Thus,
the antitrust authority should forbid them.
When auctioning o⁄ one license is optimal, we have to derive the
results on pro￿tability and welfare.
As far as welfare is concerned, the result is straightforward: a vertical
merger increases welfare, because it favors technology di⁄usion. On the
one hand, whereas under a vertical merger, both ￿rms end up producing
with the new technology (see Sandon￿s and Faul￿-Oller, 2006), the ex-
ternal patentee only auctions o⁄one license, and thus one ￿rm produces
ine¢ ciently (at cost c). On the other hand, the vertical merger stimu-
lates competition, because the royalty imposed by the merged entity to
the rival ￿rm is lower (or equal) than c.
Regarding pro￿tability, we also have a clear-cut result, namely, that
the vertical merger is always pro￿table (the joint pro￿ts of the external
laboratory and one of the ￿rms are lower than the pro￿ts of the merged
entity). For the case of a drastic innovation, the result is straightforward.
In the case of an external patentee, the patentee gets the monopoly
pro￿ts in one market (1
4) and the ￿rms get zero pro￿ts. An internal
7patentee can guarantee itself at least the same level of pro￿ts (1
4) by
setting r = c. However, as it is shown in Sandon￿s and Faul￿-Oller (2006),
for ￿ < 1, the merged ￿rm can improve by setting a lower royalty that
allows the rival ￿rm to produce. For the case of a non-drastic innovation,
the joint pro￿ts of the external patentee and one of the ￿rms is ￿i(0;c).
The merged ￿rm could achieve a higher level of pro￿ts by simply setting
r = c: ￿i(0;c) + cXi(0;c). Observe that Xi(0;c) > 0, because we are
dealing with the case of a non-drastic innovation.
The next proposition summarizes the above results:
Proposition 2 Whenever ￿ > 0:94 and c 2 (c;c) a vertical merger is
pro￿table and increases welfare.
Observe that the result in the proposition is strict, except when the
good is homogenous and the innovation is drastic. In this case, both the
internal and the external patentee lead to the same market outcome,
namely, monopolization of the market.
From the point of view of competition policy we can prescribe, in
our context, to allow for vertical mergers only when the goods are not
very di⁄erentiated and the innovation is large enough. It is interesting
to note that vertical mergers should be allowed when the market is more
competitive (when ￿ is high), which is counterintuitive. The reason
is that it is precisely in this case when the external patentee ￿nds it
pro￿table to auction o⁄only one license, which precludes full technology
di⁄usion, compared with the internal patentee which always licenses the
technology to the rival ￿rm. In other words, in our context, a vertical
merger can be seen as an instrument to favor technology di⁄usion.
3 Conclusion
Vertical mergers are very controversial regarding their e⁄ects on social
welfare. The antitrust trade-o⁄ consists on comparing their e⁄ects on
competition with their e¢ ciency gains. In this paper, we identify a new
8e¢ ciency e⁄ect of vertical mergers taken place in intensive technological
sectors. In this context, we have shown that vertical mergers can be seen
as an instrument for technology di⁄usion. When competition is high and
we consider an auction plus royalty policy, an independent laboratory
prefers to restrict the number of licenses to generate competition among
the potential licensees. In this particular case, a vertical merger between
the laboratory and one of the ￿rms in the industry is shown to be both
pro￿table and welfare improving because it achieves full di⁄usion of the
innovation.
This result should be compared with the results in Sandon￿s and
Faul￿-Oller (2006). They consider two-part tari⁄ licensing contracts (a
￿ at upfront fee plus a linear royalty) and get the strong result that
all pro￿table vertical mergers reduce welfare. This highlights the fact
that the optimal merger policy is very sensitive to the type of licensing
contracts used in reality by ￿rms. The existing empirical papers point
out that most of the contracts include an upfront fee and a royalty (see,
for example, Macho-Stadler et al., 1996, Rostocker, 1984, and Taylor
and Silberston, 1973). However, the use of patent auctions is becoming
more common nowadays. This suggests the convenience of a revision in
the process of evaluating vertical mergers by antitrust authorities.
It seems interesting to check whether the results we have obtained
for the case of two Cournot duopolists remain true when we extend the
model to encompass less concentrated industries or price competition.
In the former case, Sen and Tauman (2006), for the case of n ￿rms
producing homogenous goods, show that both an internal and external
patentee license to all ￿rms (except perhaps one). This implies that the
di⁄erence in technology di⁄usion between the external and the internal
patentee can be at most of one ￿rm (like in the present paper). Our
guess is that the incentive to license can not be lower in a model with
di⁄erentiated goods. As a consequence, the anticompetitive e⁄ect of the
auction policy that we identify in this paper should vanish as the market
9becomes less concentrated.
With respect to price competition, we have solved the model for close
enough substitute goods, ￿nding that there are regions where auctioning
o⁄ only one license is optimal. However, in those regions, given that
competition is tougher in Bertrand, a vertical merger reduces welfare
and it should be forbidden.
4 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
We have to distinguish four di⁄erent regions:
i) if c 2 (0;
￿(2 ￿ ￿)
4
], the optimal royalty when licensing to both
￿rms is equal to 0. In this case, we have to sign 2(￿i(0;0) ￿ ￿i(c;0)) ￿
(￿i(0;c) ￿ ￿i(c;0)). It can be checked that this di⁄erence is positive.






), the optimal royalty when licensing to
both ￿rms is r￿ =
￿(4c + ￿(￿2 + ￿))
2(4 ￿ 2￿2 + ￿3)
and the innovation is still non-
drastic. In this case we have to sign 2(￿i(r￿;r￿)￿￿i(c;r￿))￿(￿i(0;c)￿
￿i(c;0)). It is direct to check that if ￿ ￿ 0:940834 this di⁄erence is pos-












4 + 2￿ ￿ ￿2
4(1 + ￿)
), the optimal royalty when licensing to
both ￿rms is r￿ =
￿(4c + ￿(￿2 + ￿))
2(4 ￿ 2￿2 + ￿3)
and the innovation is drastic. This
means that when licensing to one ￿rm, the patentee gets the monopoly
pro￿ts in one market (1
4). In this case, we have to sign 2(￿i(r￿;r￿) ￿
￿i(c;r￿)) ￿ 1
4. It is direct to check that if ￿ ￿ 0:940834 this di⁄erence
is positive. If ￿ > 0:940834, it is negative when c > c and positive







iv) if c ￿
4 + 2￿ ￿ ￿2
4(1 + ￿)
, the optimal royalty when licensing to both
￿rms is r￿￿ =
￿
2(1 + ￿)
. With this royalty, the patentee gets the monopoly
10pro￿ts in both markets. This is higher than 1
4, the pro￿ts obtained when
licensing to only one ￿rm, except when ￿ = 1, that they are equal.
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